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Sections8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) oftheNational LaborRelations Act prevent a¯rmfrom
unilaterally increasing thewageit pays the union during thenegotiation of a new wage
contract. To understand this regulation, we study a counterfactual negotiation model
where the ¯rm can temporarily increase compensation to its employees during wage
negotiations. Comparing this to the case where the ¯rm does not have this option, we
show that the ¯rm may strategically increase the union's temporary wage to upset the
union's incentive to strike, decreasing the union's bargaining power, and shrinking the
set of permanent wage contracts that may arise in a perfect equilibrium. As the union
becomes more patient, the best possible equilibrium contract to the union gets worse.
In the limit, the uniqueness and hence the full e±ciency of the perfect equilibrium are
restored. We also demonstrate that allowing the union to refuse the ¯rm's temporary
compensation does not a®ect the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes.
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Created in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also known as the Wagner Act,
marked the federal government's ¯rst comprehensive legislation supporting unionization and
collective bargaining in the United States. Section 8(d) of the NLRA speci¯es that \the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment." The
Supreme Court has interpreted this good faith provision of the NLRA as making unlawful
for the management to alter any terms without the union's consent during the negotiation
(see pages 188-189 of Leslie, 2000). The Court's reason for this is not to allow a situation
where the management could undermine the union's authority to negotiate and to represent
the employees. In this vein, the Court even considers it unlawful for the management to
temporarily increase the wages it pays labor while a new contract is being negotiated.
In this paper we examine the implications of this aspect of the NLRA that prevents a
¯rm from o®ering additional compensation to the union during a wage negotiation. Aside
from undermining the union's authority, o®ering additional compensation has a strategic
e®ect: additional compensation raises the union's opportunity cost of striking. How does
the NLRA a®ect the players' bargaining behavior and the general e±ciency of equilibrium
outcomes? To address these issues, we start with the contract negotiation model of Haller
and Holden (1990) andFernandez and Glazer (1991) (also see Buschand Wen (1995), Houba
(1997), and Muthoo (1999) for the general negotiation model). In contrast to the standard
bilateral bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982), the players' payo®s during disagreement
are determined by a normal form game, called the disagreement game. This disagreement
game captures the strategic relationship between the two players other than bargaining. For
instance, in the contract negotiation model, the union may choose to either strike or work
under the expired contract while bargaining over a new contract. It is quite common that
workers continue to work under the expired contract, such as the recent negotiation between
Verizon and its union. The negotiation model is also related to the money burning literature
1in non-cooperative bargaining; see Avery and Zemsky (1994), Busch, Shi and Wen (1998),
and Manzini (1999). It has been shown that a negotiation game generally admits multiple
perfect equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient outcomes with delayed agreements. In
the contract negotiation model, in particular, the worst equilibrium contract for the union
turns out to be the expired wage contract, which can be obtained if the union keeps working
under the expired contract. In order to obtain the best equilibrium contract to the union, the
union must adopt a non-stationary strategy, striking whenever the ¯rm rejects its proposal,
but working whenever it rejects the ¯rm's proposal. In doing so, the union would be able
to impose the highest possible cost to the ¯rm when the ¯rm rejects the union's o®er. At
the same time, this striking strategy minimizes the cost the union would have to bear if it
rejects the ¯rm's o®er.
The contract negotiationmodel does not consider the possibility that the ¯rm may choose
to temporarily increase compensation to theunion. In order to conduct this research project,
we will compare two non-cooperative bargaining models. We ¯rst study a bargaining model
that generalizes the original contract negotiation model by allowing the ¯rm to temporarily
increase compensation before the union decides whether to strike during the current period
of disagreement. Although both the union and the ¯rm may strategically a®ect their dis-
agreement payo®s, we demonstrate that this model cannot be analyzed under the framework
of Busch and Wen (1995). The non-normal form disagreement game typically imposes addi-
tional restrictions on the equilibrium strategy pro¯le. We ¯nd that in some situations, the
¯rm does have an incentive to increase compensation to the union before reaching a new
wage contract. By doing so, the ¯rm would be able to lessen the union's incentive to strike,
and hence prevent the non-stationary striking behavior the union needs to obtain its best
equilibrium outcome. This model may still have multiple equilibrium outcomes, including
ine±cient outcomes. However, the ¯rm's ability to temporarily raise compensation increases
the e±ciency of perfect equilibrium outcomes in general.
The NLRA permits a temporary wage increase by the ¯rm if the union approves; it is the
2unilateral wage increasethat is deemed unlawful. In order to analyze thee®ects of the NLRA,
wethenstudy asecondmodel where theunionmay refusethe¯rm'sadditional compensation.
We add the union's consent to the ¯rm's compensation into our ¯rst model. The ¯rm may
still o®er additional compensation to the union, but the additional compensation becomes
e®ective only after the union's approval.1 We show that, however, the union cannot credibly
refuse the ¯rm's additional compensation if the ¯rm chooses to o®er in the best possible
equilibrium to the union. Therefore, allowing the union's consent will not alter the set of
perfect equilibrium outcomes. The strategic e®ect of increasing temporary wage remains
valid even when we allow the union to block the ¯rm's action.
In the next section we describe a non-cooperative bargaining model where the ¯rm may
unilaterally increase the union's compensationinany period. In Section 3, we analyze perfect
equilibriumoutcomes, particularly the best andthe worst equilibrium outcomes to the union.
We characterize how the union's best equilibrium can be drastically a®ected by the ¯rm's
ability to temporarily increase wage, upsetting the union's incentive to strike. We modify
our model in Section 4 to allow the union to block the ¯rm's o®er before choosing between
striking and working in any period. We show that the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes
is not a®ected by such a modi¯cation. Lastly, we summarize the paper and provide a few
concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 A Model with Unilateral Compensation
Consider a situation where a union and a ¯rm negotiate a new wage contract that speci¯es
how to share the ¯rm's future gross pro¯t, normalized to one per period over an in¯nite
horizon. The expired wage contract is denoted as w0 2 [0;1]. The union must be paid at
least w0 per period if the union works during the contract negotiation.
The negotiation proceeds with alternating o®ers as in Rubinstein's (1982) model. The
union proposes in odd periods and the ¯rm proposes in even periods. There are four stages
1The Court deems that it is the ¯rm's unilateral compensation that is at odds with the NLRA, see page
188-189 of Leslie (2000).
3in every bargaining period. In any odd period, including the ¯rst period, such that no
agreement has been reached, the union proposes a wage demand w0 2 [0;1] in the ¯rst stage,
and then the ¯rm decides whether to accept the union's demand in the second stage. If
the ¯rm accepts the union's demand, the negotiation ends. If the ¯rm rejects the union's
demand, the negotiation proceeds to the third stage where the ¯rm may o®er a temporary
compensationc0 ¸ w0 to theunionfor the current period.2 Inthe fourthstage afterobserving
the ¯rm's compensationc0, the union decides whether towork inthe current period(in which
case the union receives c0 and the ¯rm receives 1 ¡ c0), or to strike (in which case both the
union and the ¯rm receive 0). The negotiation then proceeds to the following even period.
Similarly, there are four stages in any even period. The ¯rm o®ers an wage contract
w00 2 [0;1] in the ¯rst stage and the union decides whether to accept the ¯rm's o®er in the
second stage. The union's acceptance concludes the negotiation. Otherwise, the union's
rejection leads the negotiation to the third stage, where the ¯rm may o®er a compensation
c00 ¸ w0 for the current period. In the fourth stage, the union decides whether to work (in
which case the union receives c00 and the ¯rm receives 1¡c00), or to strike (in which case both
the union and the ¯rm receive 0). The following Figure 1 illustrates this negotiation process




















































the ¯rm proposes the union proposes
Figure 1. Contract negotiation with unilateral compensation.
The model presented above has perfect information, sohistories and strategies arede¯ned
2There is no upper bound for the ¯rm's compensation. Presumably the ¯rm can borrow to ¯nance
the compensation. However, we will see that the ¯rm will never compensate more than its gross pro¯t in
equilibrium.
4in the usual fashion. For example, a history consists of all past contract proposals and
rejections, all past compensations o®ered by the ¯rm, and all past decisions by the union on
whetherto work or tostrike. Astrategy assignsa feasibleaction totheacting party after each
possible ¯nite history. Every strategy pro¯le induces aunique probability distribution onthe
set of pure outcome paths. Denote a generic pure outcome path as ¼ = (d1;d2;¢¢¢;dT¡1;aT),





(0;0) if the union strikes in period t,
(c;1¡c) if the union works for c ¸ w0 in period t,
and aT 2 ¢1 (the unit simplex in R2) represents the agreement reached in period T ¸ 1.
An outcome with perpetual disagreement is represented by a in¯nite sequence of interim
disagreement payo® vectors (or equivalently T = 1). From such a generic outcome path ¼,









T¡1ai; for i = u;f;
where (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 are the union's and ¯rm's discount factors per bargaining period. In
this paper, we will adopt the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which induces
a Nash equilibrium in every subgame after any possible ¯nite history. Hereafter, we simply
refer to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium.
Our model generalizes the contract negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) by allowing the ¯rm to o®er temporary compensation to the
union. In other words, if the ¯rm is restricted to o®er c = w0 in every stage 3, then the
model described here is equivalent to the contract negotiation model. Now we review some
of the key results from the contract negotiation model. The following Proposition 1 asserts
the lowest and the highest equilibrium contracts to the union in the contract negotiation
model:
Proposition 1 In the contract negotiation model (i.e., where c = w0),
(i) the lowest equilibrium contract in any period is w0 for all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2;





w0 if (±u;±f) 62 A;
(1¡±f)+±f(1¡±u)w0
1¡±u±f if (±u;±f) 2 A;
(1)
and the highest equilibrium contract in any even period is
1¡ mf = (1¡ ±u)w0 + ±uMu; where (2)
A =
(
(±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 : ±f · ±A
f(±u;w0) =
±2






Proof: See Lemmas 2 and 4 of Fernandez and Glazer (1991). Q.E.D.
This contract negotiation model has multiple equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient
ones,4 if and only if (±u;±f) 2 A for any given w0 2 [0;1]. Note that (±u;±f) 2 A if and only
if
w
0 · ±u(1¡ mf) =
±2
u(1¡ ±f) + ±u(1¡ ±u)w0
1¡ ±u±f
: (4)
Condition (4) ensures the subgame perfection of a strategy pro¯le in which the union strikes
in any odd period after the ¯rm rejects the union's demand, but works in any even period
after the union rejects the ¯rm's o®er. The right side of (4) represents the union's highest
possible continuation payo® if the union strikes in an odd period, while the left side of
(4) represents the union's lowest possible continuation payo® if the union works in an odd
period. More speci¯cally, if the union works then the union will be punished by the lowest
equilibrium contract w0 in the continuation game. If the union strikes then the union will be
rewarded by the highest equilibrium contract 1¡ mf in the continuation game. Condition
(4) ensures that the union will strike in an odd period to punish the ¯rm for rejecting its
o®er. Given the union's alternating strategies between work and strike, the ¯rm's interim
disagreement payo® is 0 when the ¯rm responds to the union's demand, and the union's
interim disagreement payo® is w0 when the union responds to the ¯rm's o®er. Equilibrium
3By convention, Mu denotes the union's highest equilibrium payo® in an odd period and mf denotes
¯rm's lowest equilibrium payo® in an even period.
4When there are multiple equilibria, they can used to support equilibria with delayed agreement, see for
example, pages 50-51 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
6contracts, Mu in an odd period and 1 ¡mf in an even period, correspond to the stationary
equilibrium outcomes with interim disagreement payo® w0 to the union and 0 to the ¯rm.
As a special case when the union and the ¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1),
Proposition 1 simpli¯es to:
Corollary 1.1 If the ¯rm is not allowed to o®er anyadditional compensation, and the union
and the ¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1), then
(i) the lowest equilibrium contract in any period is w0 for all ± 2 (0;1);
(ii) the highest equilibrium contracts in an odd and an even periods are, respectively,
Mu =
(






w0 · ± < 1;
1 ¡mf =
(






w0 · ± < 1:
In Appendix A, we demonstrate that the model described here cannot be analyzed by
the general negotiation model of Busch and Wen (1995), where the disagreement game is a
static game given in normal form. The reason is that the disagreement game in our model,
where the ¯rm o®ers compensation and then the union decides to either work or strike,
is not a static game but a dynamic game. In Appendix A, we show that treating this
dynamic disagreement game in its normal form does not alter the set of equilibrium payo®s
characterized by Proposition 1. However, when we treat the disagreement in its original
extensive form, we show in this paper that the highest equilibrium contract in an odd period
is sometimes strictly less than Mu. Subgame perfection imposes constraints on theadditional
subgames that begin during the dynamic disagreement game.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we investigate equilibrium outcomes in our model where the ¯rm may uni-
laterally compensate the union during the contract negotiation. We will derive a range of
equilibrium contracts. Our model has multiple equilibria whenever the contract negotiation
model has multiple equilibria. Comparing with the contract negotiation model, we identify
7three sets of discount factors under which the ¯rm behaves quite di®erently in the best equi-
librium to the union. On one extreme when the union is su±ciently impatient relative to the
¯rm, the ¯rm does not have to compensate the union since there is a unique equilibrium that
leads to the lowest equilibrium contract. On the other extreme when the union is su±ciently
patient relative to the ¯rm, the ¯rm has incentive to o®er additional compensation in order
to induce the union to work in every odd period. The ¯rm bene¯ts from compensating the
union since the highest equilibrium contract is actually less than that if the ¯rm does not
compensate the union. When the union's discount factor is in an intermediate range, the
¯rm chooses not to compensate the union since it is too costly to induce the union to work in
every period. It is worthwhile to notice the ¯rm's di®erent behavior when there are multiple
equilibria. Given the ¯rm's discount factor, the highest equilibrium contract eventually falls
with respect to the union's discount factor, a result that is quite counter-intuitive. As the
union becomes su±ciently patient, any equilibrium contract will be arbitrarily close to the
expired contract, which is also the lowest equilibrium contract.
3.1 The Lowest Equilibrium Contract
We begin the analysis of our model by establishing the existence of a simple equilibrium for
all discount factors (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 and all expired wage contracts w0 2 [0;1]. As in the
contract negotiation model, w0 is the lowest equilibrium contract for all possible discount
factors.
Proposition 2 For all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 and w0 2 [0;1], there is an e±cient equilibrium
where the union and the ¯rm agree on w0 in the ¯rst period.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 is supported by a simple and stationary strategy pro¯le,
in which the union always demands w0 and rejects any o®er that is lower than w0, the ¯rm
always o®ers w0 and rejects any demand that is higher than w0, the ¯rm never o®ers any
additional compensation, and the union always works. The proof of Proposition 2 shows
8that neither the union nor the ¯rm has any incentive to deviate from this prescribed strategy
pro¯le. It is obvious thatw0 is alsothe lowest equilibrium contract since the union can choose
to work and receive at least w0 in every period during the course of contract negotiation.
Now we state this result as
Proposition 3 For all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 and w0 2 [0;1], the union never receives less than
w0 in any equilibrium.
3.2 The Highest Equilibirum Contract: Conditions
With the existence of an equilibrium, we now turn our attention to the highest equilibrium
contract. Let M¤
u be the supremum of the union's equilibrium payo®s in any odd period,
and m¤
f be the in¯mum of the ¯rm's equilibrium payo®s in any even period. We use M¤
u and
m¤
f here to distinguish them from those in the contract negotiation model. The supremum
of the union's equilibrium payo®s in any even period is thereby 1 ¡ m¤
f. From the setup of
the model and existence result of Proposition 2, both M¤
u and m¤
f are well de¯ned functions
of (±u;±f) and w0 2 [0;1]. Proposition 3 implies that
M¤
u ¸ w0 and 1 ¡ m¤
f ¸ w0:
Similar to the backward induction technique by Shaked and Sutton (1984), we now
derive a set of necessary conditions for M¤
u and m¤
f, imposed by subgame perfection. First,
consider an even period where the ¯rm makes an o®er. By subgame perfection, since the
union's payo®s in next (odd) period cannot exceed M¤
u, and the union's payo® during the
current even period cannot exceed c00 (if the ¯rm compensates c00 and the union works), the
union's payo® from rejecting a ¯rm's o®er cannot exceed (1¡±u)c00+±M¤
u. This implies that
the union will accept any o®er that exceeds (1¡ ±u)c00+±M¤
u. Therefore in any equilibrium,




c00¸w0 [1¡ (1 ¡ ±u)c
00 ¡ ±uM
¤




9in any even period by making an o®er su±ciently high (such as 1¡m¤
f) to induce the union
to accept while o®ering no additional compensation (c00 = w0) if the union rejects.
Next consider an odd period where the union proposes a contract demand. Recall that
there are four stages in an odd period. In the last stage after the union rejects the ¯rm's
o®er and the ¯rm o®ers c0 ¸ w0, the union decides to strike or work during the current
(odd) period. The ¯rm is able to induce the union to work by o®ering a su±ciently high
compensation c0 such that
(1 ¡±u)c
0 +±uw
0 ¸ ±u(1¡ m
¤
f): (6)
The left hand side of (6) represents the union's lowest possible continuation value if the
union works under compensation c0, while the right hand side of (6) is the union's highest
possible continuation value if the union strikes. Condition (6) states that the union has a
higher payo® from working than from striking.
If the ¯rm chooses to induce the union to work with c0 that satis¯es condition (6), the
¯rm will receive at least
(1¡ ±f)(1¡ c0) + ±fm¤
f:
Alternatively, the ¯rm may choose not to o®er any additional compensation to the union.
As in the contract negotiation model, the union may chooses to strike during the current
odd period. Therefore, if the ¯rm chooses not to o®er any additional compensation to the
union, Proposition 1 applies and the ¯rm's equilibrium payo®s are not less than 1¡Mu. To
summarize, the ¯rm chooses between these two alternatives and so the union's equilibrium
payo®s in an odd period are not higher than
M
¤























Note that in order to induce the union to work during the current (odd) period, the ¯rm's
compensation c0 must satisfy condition (6). Now we state these arguments as
10Proposition 4 For all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 and w0 2 [0;1], M¤
u and m¤
f satisfy (5) and (7).
In other words, conditions (5) and (7) are necessary for the highest equilibrium contracts
M¤
u in every odd period and 1 ¡ m¤
f in every even period. The remaining task is then to
solve M¤
u and m¤
f from (5) and (7).
3.3 Incentive to Compensate
Instead of solving M¤
u and m¤
f directly from (5) and (7), we will utilize the results we have
so far to pin down the values of M¤
u and m¤
f for all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2 and w0 2 [0;1].
Proposition 3 states that w0 is the lowest equilibrium contract. When (±u;±f) 62 A, w0 is
also theuniqueequilibrium contract if the¯rm doesnot o®er any additional compensation. It
is obvious then that when(±u;±f) 62 A, the ¯rm shouldnot o®er any additional compensation
to the union.
Lemma 1 When (±u;±f) 62 A, we have that M¤
u = 1 ¡ m¤
f = w0.
When (±u;±f) 2 A, Proposition 1 asserts that
Mu =
(1¡ ±f)+ ±f(1¡ ±u)w0
1 ¡ ±u±f
: (8)
To obtain the M¤
u and m¤
f, condition (5) states that the ¯rm should not o®er any additional
compensation to the union and the union should work in every even period.
Suppose that the ¯rm chooses to induce the union to work in an odd period with c0 ¸
w0 that satis¯es condition (6), then the proposals that are consistent with the subgame
perfection must satisfy the following equations:
1 ¡ M
0










Equation (9) states that the ¯rm is indi®erent between accepting contract M0
u and rejecting
it (after which collecting 1 ¡ c0 in the current odd period and m0
f in the following even
11period). Equation (10) states the union is indi®erent between accepting contract 1¡m0
f and
rejecting it (after which collecting w0 in the current even period and M0
u in the following








u by (11) is increasing with respect to c0 and is equal to Mu at c0 = 1. In the
best possible equilibrium to the union, if the ¯rm is able to induce the union to work in an
odd period with c0 ¸ w0, then M0
u by (11) will be the highest equilibrium contract in an odd
period. Comparing M0
u in (11) and Mu in (8) when (±u;±f) 2 A, it is obvious that
M0
u · Mu if and only if c0 · 1:
This result is quite intuitive and important. Since it is always costly to the ¯rm if the
union strikes after ¯rm's rejection, the ¯rm bene¯ts if the ¯rm can successfully induce the
union to work in an odd period without compensating the union more than its gross pro¯t.
Otherwise, it is too costly for the ¯rm to induce the union to work, and the ¯rm is better o®
by not compensating the union more than w0 in an odd period. Proposition 5 asserts that
the threshold where the ¯rm is just indi®erent between o®ering additional compensation
and not o®ering additional compensation, the necessary compensation needed to induce the
union to work must be equal to 1.
Proposition 5 If the ¯rm can de¯nitely induce the union to work with c0 · 1 in an odd
period, then the ¯rm will do so in the union's best possible equilibrium.
From condition (6), the optimal (the lowest necessary) compensation needed to induce





f ¡ w0): (12)
At the threshold where the ¯rm is indi®erent between compensating the union with c¤ = 1
and not o®ering any compensation, the ¯rm has the same (lowest) equilibrium payo® from









f givenby (13) is the critical valuesuchthat ifthe ¯rm's lowestequilibrium
payo® is higher than the right hand side of (13), the optimal compensation c¤ will be less
than 1, and so the ¯rm will o®er c¤ to the union. Otherwise, the ¯rm will not o®er any
additional compensation to the union. At such a threshold, the ¯rm has the same (lowest)










0 = (1¡ ±u)w
0 +±u
(1 ¡ ±f)+ ±f(1 ¡ ±u)w0
1¡ ±u±f
: (14)










Dde¯ne the set B as
B =
n




We will show that the ¯rm will choose to induce the union to work in every odd periodif and
only if (±u;±f) 2 B. The following lemma asserts that the fact of B ½ A for all w0 2 [0;1],
as well as a few other properties of sets A and B:
Lemma 2 Given w0 2 [0;1], we have
(i) ±A































= 0 at ±u = 1:






























Figure 2. Sets A and B of (±u;±f).
3.4 Values of M¤
u and m¤
f
To solve the value of M¤
u in terms of (±u;±f) and w0, we ¯rst compute the corresponding
value f M¤
u when the ¯rm o®ers the optimal compensation c¤ by (6), then compare f M¤
u with
Mu to determine the value of M¤
u. If the ¯rm o®ers c¤ in every odd period then the union













Equations (5) and (17) yield the corresponding value of f M¤
u when the ¯rm o®ers c¤ to the




±u +±f ¡ 2±u±f
1¡ ±u
[(1¡ ±u)w











u ¡ 2±u±f +2±2
u±f
1¡ ±u ¡ ±2




5For the sake of argument, the ¯rm could o®er slightly higher than c¤ so that the union strictly prefers
working over striking.
14Equation (18) gives the highest equilibrium contract when the ¯rm o®ers the optimal com-
pensation c¤ to the union in every odd period.
From the construction, it is easy to see that on the boundary of set B where ±f =
±B
f (±u;w0), the ¯rm has the same interim disagreement payo® of zero from either compen-
sating the union with its entire gross pro¯t in every odd period or not compensating the
union at all so that the union will strike in every odd period. Recall that (18) gives the
highest equilibrium contract when the ¯rm provides just su±cient compensation to avoid
the union's striking in every odd period. To summarize, we have






Mu if (±u;±f) 62 B
f M¤
u if (±u;±f) 2 B
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
w0 if (±u;±f) 62 A
(1¡±f)+±f(1¡±u)w0






u±fw0 if (±u;±f) 2 B
As a special case when the union and the ¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1),
Proposition 6 simpli¯es to






















The highest possible equilibrium contract M¤
u can be supported by an equilibrium for
all (±u;±f) 62 B in the same way as in the contract negotiation model. When (±u;±f) 2 B,
supporting M¤
u in an equilibrium involves the ine±cient continuation payo®, such as payo®
vector (w0;m¤
f) in the subgame after the union works under optimal compensation c¤ in the
previous odd period. If ine±cient proposal is feasible then M¤
u can be easily supported by
equilibrium. Otherwise, Proposition 6 provides an upper bound of all equilibrium contracts.
Compared with the contract negotiation model, our Proposition 6 implies that the ¯rm
bene¯ts from its ability to compensate when the union's and the ¯rm's discount factors lie
15in set B. The lowest equilibrium contract is una®ected by the ¯rm's ability to compensate.
This means that allowing the ¯rm to compensate the union generally improves the e±ciency
of equilibrium outcomes, but in a somewhat lopsided way. The ¯rm's ability to compensate
the union may limit the highest equilibrium contract to the union. This e®ect depends on







u ¡ 2±u±f + 2±2
u±f
1¡ ±u ¡ ±2









It becomes so dramatic that as the union becomes more and more patient relative to the
¯rm, any equilibrium contract will be su±ciently close to the expired contract w0, which is
the lowest equilibrium contract to the union.
Proposition 7 For any given ±f 2 (0;1) and w0 2 [0;1], we have lim±u!1M¤
u = w0.
Figure 3 below illustrates Mu and M¤
u for a given value of ±f. Notice that M¤
u = M¤
u for
±u · ¹ ±u, where (±u;±f) 2 B for all ±u ¸ ¹ ±u. When ±u ¸ ¹ ±u, Mu is increasing (to one as ±u
goes to one), but M¤











Figure 3. Mu and M¤
u for ±f = 0:8 and w0 = 0:4.
16Propositions 6and7 (alsoFigure3) suggest, as theunionbecomes moreandmore patient,
the highest equilibrium contract is decreasing, which is quite di®erent from the conventional
result that patience is a virtue. The reason for this counter-intuitive result can be argued
by one of our early results. As the union becomes more and more patient, the union needs
less compensation to work in every odd period, which hurts the union in its best possible
equilibrium outcome.
To conclude, we ¯nd that the ¯rm may bene¯t from compensating the union in odd
periods when the union is relatively more patient than the ¯rm, namely when their discount
factors lie in set B. However, the ¯rm will not carry out the compensation since the union
and the ¯rm would agree on a new wage contract immediately. When the union is not more
patient relative to the ¯rm, the ¯rm could not bene¯t from compensating the union. In this
situation, the ¯rm either does not have to compensate (when (±u;±f) 62 A), or does not want
to compensate since the compensation needed to provide the union enough incentive to work
is too high (when (±u;±f) 2 AnB).
4 Compensation with the Union's Consent
As we have argued, the NLRA prohibits the ¯rm from o®ering unilaterally additional com-
pensation to the union during a contract negotiation. Such unilateral actions from the ¯rm
are considered to undermine the union's authority to represent the workers. In the pre-
vious section, we showed that under certain conditions, the ¯rm has an incentive to o®er
compensation to induce the union to work in every odd period in the reaching the highest
possible equilibrium contract, so the ¯rm's unilateral ability to compensate can also hurt the
workers economically. The NLRA does not completely prohibit the ¯rm from compensating
the workers, but rather provides power to the union to block the ¯rm's action.
Now we examine whether it is credible for the union to block ¯rm's compensation if the
¯rm chooses to compensate in the best possible equilibrium to the union. Our answer is
negative. In order to analyze this issue more formally, we modify our model studied in the
17previoussectionsothatthe unionneeds todecidewhether toapprove the¯rm's compensation
before deciding whether to strike or to work in any period after disagreement.6
The negotiation proceeds in the fashion of alternating-o®er as in the previous model.
There is one more stage where the uniondecides whether to approve the ¯rm's compensation
o®er. More speci¯cally, in any odd period before reaching an agreement, the union proposes
w0 2 [0;1] in the ¯rst stage, the ¯rm then decides whether to accept the union's demand in
the second stage. Acceptance concludes the negotiation. At the third stage after the ¯rm
rejects the union's demand, the ¯rm may o®er compensation c0 ¸ w0 to the union. Di®erent
from the previous model, the union now needs to decide whether to approve the ¯rm's
compensation in stage four. In stage ¯ve, the union decides whether to work for c0 ¸ w0
if the union has approved c0 or for expired contract w0 if the union has disapproved c0, or
whether to strike during the current period. Then the negotiation proceeds to the following
even period, which is similar to an odd period except that the ¯rm proposes a wage contract
and the union responds, stages 3, 4 and 5 in an even period are identical to those in an odd
period.
As in the model where the ¯rm may unilaterally o®er additional compensation, this
modi¯ed model has perfect information. Histories, strategies and payo®s are de¯ned in
the usual fashion according to the additional element in the model. The union's decision on
whether to approve the ¯rm's compensation introduces new subgames so subgame perfection
requires the strategy pro¯le induced in these new subgames to be Nash equilibria as well.
Despite the union's ability to block the ¯rm's compensation, w0 is still the lowest equi-
librium contract. In the rest of this section, we show that the union cannot credibly block
the ¯rm's additional compensation when the ¯rm o®ers in the best possible equilibrium to
the union. When (±u;±f) 62 B, we know that the ¯rm either does not have to or does not
want to compensate the union. It will continue to be the case when the union can block the
¯rm's additional compensation. Suppose that the union always approves the compensation
6Whether the union decides simultaneously or sequentially to approve/disapprove the ¯rm's compensation
and to work/strike will not change our conclusions.
18o®ered by the ¯rm. Then this modi¯ed model is virtually the same as our original model.
On the other hand, if the ¯rm does not o®er any additional compensation, then the union's
approval decision becomes irrelevant.
We now concentrate our attention on the situation of (±u;±f) 2 B. We adopt the same
notationas before: M¤
u is a upper bound of the union's equilibrium payo®s inany odd period
and m¤
f is a lower bound of the ¯rm's equilibrium payo®s in an even period.
First, for the same argument as from our original model where the ¯rm may unilateral
increase compensation, condition (5) holds here as well. In the best possible equilibrium to
the union, the ¯rm will not o®er any additional compensation and the union will work in
any even period.
Next, we consider an odd period. Recall that the union may now block the ¯rm's com-
pensation o®er. In order for the ¯rm's compensation c0 to be ine®ective, it must be the
case that the union strikes in the current odd period whether the union approves c0 or not.
Note that if the union chooses to strike, then its continuation payo®s will not be higher than
±u(1 ¡ m¤
f). If the union chooses to work for the current period however, its continuation
payo®s will not be less than w0 (after the union refuses c0) or (1 ¡ ±u)c0 + ±uw0 (after the
union approves c0). Figure 4 illustrates the situation that the union is most likely to strike
in an odd period after the ¯rm o®ers c0 ¸ w0, where the union is rewarded with the high-
est equilibrium contract in the continuation after it strikes and punished with the lowest

































Figure 4. The union's four possible continuation payo®s.
Restricting c0 ¸ w0 implies that the union never disapprove (D) the ¯rm's compensation
19and then works for the current odd period, which is quite intuitive. It is not hard to see
from Figure 4 that when condition (6) holds, it is not credible for the union to disapprove
(D) c0 and then to strike (S). In addition, any equilibrium outcome in our original model can
also be supported in the current model by duplicating the continuation equilibrium in the
subgames after the union approves or disapproves the ¯rm's compensation.
Proposition 8 Allowing the union to block the ¯rm's additional compensation will not
change the set of equilibrium payo®s.
Proposition8impliesthat suppressingthe union's ability toblock the ¯rm's compensation
makes no di®erence, the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 are still valid. In particular,
we have found that the ¯rm can still upset the union's incentive to strike when (±u;±f) 2 B
even if the union can block the ¯rm's action.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that a ¯rm may have an incentive to increase workers' temporary
wages during a contract negotiation. This could happeneven when the ¯rm needs to pay the
workers almost all of its gross pro¯t. Higher wages (either expired or temporary) will lower
then the union's incentive to strike. It is well known by now that the type of negotiation
model we adopted in this study admits multiple equilibrium outcomes. We address the issues
we concern by studying the range of wages that may arise in equilibrium. Our interpretation
of the NLRA does not help the union in the sense that the union cannot credibly block
the ¯rm's additional compensation when the ¯rm decides to o®er. From the point of view
in non-cooperative bargaining literature, our model demonstrates what the ¯rm can do
legally to prevent the union's strategic switching between work and strike during a contract
negotiation. When parties are su±ciently patient, or alternatively when o®er and counter-
o®er are made more rapidly, our model predicts a relatively small wage increase from a
contract negotiation.
20There are a number of issues we plan to investigate. One issue is the duration of the
¯rm's compensation if it is even o®ered. More speci¯cally, what happens if the ¯rm's com-
pensation remains in e®ect for more than one periods? It is quite intuitive that if the ¯rm's
compensation is valid for an even number of periods, the ¯rm cannot bene¯t from o®ering
additioncompensation at all. However, if the ¯rm's compensation is validfor an oddnumber
of periods, then the ¯rm could be better o® by o®ering compensation strategically. Another
direction we can consider is what if the ¯rm can lower the wage paid to the union during a
contract negotiation.
216 Appendix A
In this appendix, we argue that treating the dynamic disagreement game in its normal form
does not alter the set of equilibrium payo®s characterized by Proposition 1. Consider the
normal form representationof the disagreement, where the ¯rm's andunion's strategy spaces
and payo® functions are
Af = [w
0;1)
Au = fau(¢) : [w
0;1) ! fStrike, Workgg;
(du(au;af);df(au;af)) =
(
(0;0) if af = c and au(c) = Strike,
(c;1¡c) if af = c and au(c) = Work.
Note that the union's decision to work or strike depends on the ¯rm's compensation o®er.
Accordingto Busch and Wen(1995), in order to support the highest equilibrium contract,
we need to ¯nd the ¯rm's lowest disagreement payo® and the union's highest disagreement
payo® supportable in an equilibrium. The ¯rm's lowest supportable disagreement payo® is
the ¯rm's minimax value 0 in the disagreement game, achieved when the union strikes. The
union's highest supportable disagreement payo® is the highest di®erence between the union's










= [c¡ ((1 ¡ w
0) ¡ (1¡ c))] = w
0;
achieved when the union works even if the ¯rm does not o®er any additional compensation.
This implies that Proposition 1 would continue to hold if one treated the normal form
representationofthe underlyinggame as thedisagreement game. Therefore, allowingthe¯rm
to o®er additional compensation would not change the results from the contract negotiation
model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991).
7 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the following strategy pro¯le: In any odd period, the
union demands w0 and the ¯rm accepts demands of no more than w0. In any even period,
22the ¯rm o®ers w0 and the union accepts o®ers of no less than w0. The ¯rm does not o®er
any additional compensation and the union chooses to work in any period. In what follows,
we show that this strategy pro¯le constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Since the continuation payo®s are independent of the history in any stage of any period,
it is optimal for the union to work for any compensation. Given that, the ¯rm should not
o®er any additional compensation. In any odd period, the ¯rm receives 1¡w0 after rejecting
the union's demand so the ¯rm will reject any wage demand higher than w0. In any even
period, the union's payo® from rejecting the ¯rm's o®er is w0 so it is optimal to the union
to reject any wage o®er that is less than w0. In summary, neither the union nor the ¯rm has
any incentive to deviate from the strategy pro¯le described above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is divided into four parts.
(i) Recall ±A
f (±u;w0) from (2), note that
(1¡ w0)±2
u + w0±u ¡ w0 > 0 i® ±u < ¡
q
(4 ¡3w0)w0 +w0
2¡ 2w0 or ±u >
q
(4 ¡3w0)w0 ¡ w0
2 ¡2w0 ;
±2




0) > 0 i® either 0 < ±u < w
0 or
q
(4 ¡ 3w0)w0 ¡ w0
2 ¡ 2w0 < ±u < 1:
On the other hand, when ±2
u ¡ w0±u < 0, ±A
f (±u;w0) < 1 if and only if
(1 ¡ w0)±2
u+ w0±u ¡ w0 > ±2
u ¡ w0±u , w0(1 ¡±u)2 < 0;
which is impossible. When ±2
u ¡ w0±u > 0, ±A
f (±u;w0) < 1 if and only if w0(1 ¡ ±u)2 > 0,
which is trivial.
(ii) Recall ±B








2¡ 2w0 or ±u >
p
5¡ 4w0 ¡ 1
2¡ 2w0 ;
(2¡ w0)±2






0) > 0 i® either 0 < ±u <
1
2 ¡ w0 or
p
5 ¡ 4w0 ¡ 1
2 ¡ 2w0 < ±u < 1:
23On the other hand, when (2 ¡ w0)±2
u ¡ ±u < 0, ±B
f (±u;w0) < 1 if and only if
(1¡ w0)±2
u +±u ¡ 1 > (2¡ w0)±2
u ¡ ±u , (1¡ ±u)2 < 0;
which is impossible. When (2¡ w0)±2
u ¡ ±u > 0, ±B
f (±u;w0) < 1 if and only if (1 ¡ ±u)2 > 0,
which is trivial.







f (±u;w0) if and
only if
(1¡ w0)±2




u +±u ¡ 1
±u[(2 ¡ w0)±u¡ 1]
, (1¡ w
0)
2 ¢ (1¡ ±u)
2 ¢ ±u > 0;
which is trivial for all permissible values of ±u and w0.










At ±u = 1, this derivative equals 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: From condition (7), we have that M¤
u = minfMu; f M¤
ug. For
(±u;±f), Mu is increasing with respect to ±u for any given ±f. Now we show that f M¤
u is
decreasing with respect to ±u for any given ±f wherever it is well de¯ned. Di®erentiating f M¤
u








±f ¡ 2±f ¢ ±u+ (2±f ¡ 1) ¢ ±2
u




(±f ¡ 1)[±f ¡ 2(2±f ¡ 1) ¢ ±u+ (2±f ¡ 1) ¢ ±2
u]
[1 ¡ (1+ ±f) ¢ ±u+ (2±f ¡1) ¢ ±2
u]2 : (20)
Observe that the second term on the numerator of (20) is




±f > 0 when ±u = 0




[±f ¡ 2(2±f ¡ 1) ¢ ±u+ (2±f ¡ 1) ¢ ±2
u] = 2(2±f ¡ 1)(±u¡ 1);
24which is positive if and only if ±f < 1=2. We have shown that ±f¡2(2±f¡1)¢±u+(2±f¡1)¢±2
u
is monotonic with respect to ±u for any given ±f 2 (0;1), and it has positive values at ±u = 0
and 1. Therefore, it is always positive for all (±u;±f) 2 (0;1)2.
Together with the fact the (±f ¡ 1) < 0 (the ¯rst term on the numerator of (20)), the
right hand side of (20) is negative and so f M¤
u is decreasing with respect to ±u for any given
±f. As we argued, f M¤
u = Mu on the boundary of set B and Mu is increasing with respect
to ±u for any given ±f. This implies that if (±u;±f) 2 B, we must have Mu > f M¤
u and so
M¤
u = f M¤
u if and only if (±u;±f) 2 B. Q.E.D.
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